This work considers the key management for secure multicast in the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) model and proposes a methodology to establish the minimal key bit length that guarantees a specified degree of confidentiality for the multicast communications managed within this model. We also introduce the concepts of information lifetime and of information dependence to formalize the intuition that keys should be longer, and thus stronger, when used to encrypt "important" information, that is information (including other keys) that need to be kept confidential for a longer period. Then, these concepts are used to build a formal theory that is applied to set the correct bit length of every key in the system in such a way to guarantee the prescribed degree of confidentiality of the multicast messages. Quite surprisingly, we formally show that not all the keys in the LKH hierarchy should have the same length; this observation, besides being of theoretical interest, also leads to substantial savings in terms of memory, computation, and bandwidth. The theory we develop to obtain these results can be useful in other contexts as well.
We consider the LKH model described in [Wong et al. 2000] (the key graph model ).
3
That is, there is a multicast group M = {u 0 , .., u n−1 }, a dynamically changing 4 set of users. A join to the group occurs when a new user is added to M, while 5 a leave occurs when a user is evicted from M. We assume that there is a super 6 user, called the center, that can send a multicast message to all the members of the 7 group. The message is sent over an insecure channel, therefore the same message can be received by other entities not belonging to M. To enforce the privacy of 9 the messages, we can assume that a cryptographic module, based on symmetric key 10 cryptography, is available to the users in M and to the center. When the center has 11 to send a message m to M, the center computes m = E k1 (m) and then broadcasts 12 m to the group. Key k 1 , shared by all the users and the center, is the group key.
13
The key graph model requires to build up a balanced tree of auxiliary keys (in the 14 following key tree), where the root is the group key and the leaves are the private 15 keys of the users in M. Each user stores the keys on its leaf-root path; for example,
16
in Figure 1 , user u 5 holds its private key k 13 -shared with the center only-, the 17 group key k 1 -shared with all users in M-, and auxiliary keys k 3 and k 6 -each tree is binary and that the number of users in the group is exactly n = |M| = 2 h ,
22
where h is the height of the tree. This assumption does not affect the generality 23 of our findings and simplifies the presentation-the same kind of results hold for 24 arbitrary key graph trees. We will use the following terminology: (1) the root of 25 the key graph (that is the group key) is located at height 0, while its leaves are at 26 height h; (2) the group key is denoted by k 1 , while, for all i, the left son of key k i 27 is key k 2i , and the right son of key k i is k 2i+1 ; (3) the private key of user u j is 28 key k j+n , for all j. Figure 1 shows a 8-users key tree using this notation.
29
assumption is coherent with our goal to preserve information confidentiality.
23
We assume that legitimate users do not leak any information. This assumption 
27
Note that tracing traitor schemes do not prevent key disclosure by legitimate users,
28
but can deter such a malicious behavior since the leaking user can be traced and evicted users, we say we are in the disclosure security model. As we will see later 38 in this paper, there is a sensible difference between these two security models. 
The Adversary

40
The number, quality, and complexity of attacks a protocol can be subject to is 
18
In the following analysis, we will consider adversaries with different capabilities.
19
According to a generally accepted classification provided by it is used to encrypt information for some time, and eventually it expires (when 4 the key is not used any more). We will refer to the length of the life of a key as its 5 lifetime.
6
Similarly, also payload has a life. In multicast communications, we assume the 7 payload is generated when it is sent to the group and it expires when its information 8 content is not valuable any more. Again, we will refer to the length of the life of 9 a given payload as its lifetime. publicly known -there are many free services that deliver stock quotes with a short 14 delay.
15
Our goal is to protect the confidentiality of the payload throughout its life.
16
Clearly, it is important to protect the keys used in the group as well: If the group 17 key, for instance, is compromised, then also the payload is compromised. However, 
Dependent Information and Importance of Keys
7
Keys are used to protect information. So, a key is "important" if it is used to 8 protect "important" information, that is information that is required to be kept 9 confidential for a longer period with respect to other information managed by the 10 system. Here, we formalize this claim. Note that, while it is usually clear how to 11 set confidentiality requirements for data (i. e. , the payload sent to the multicast 12 group), it is not trivial to understand what requirements should be asked for the 13 keys. Indeed, during standard multicast group activities, many users join and 14 leave, and many keys are generated, are used for encrypting either the payload or 15 re-keying messages (that carry other keys) and eventually expire. So, we start from 16 a formal definition of "importance" of keys. Later, we will show how this notion 17 can be used to build a methodology for choosing the bit length of every key in the 18 LKH tree to guarantee a required degree of confidentiality of multicast data. We say that a multicast system (such as the LKH model) is secure against the 5 brute force attack if no payload message can be decrypted while in its lifetime as 6 a result of a brute-force attack. Interestingly, we will show that the "importance" 7 (i. e. the bit-length) of a key does not directly depend on its lifetime, but on the 8 lifetime of the information dependent on that key.
9
Claim 1. A multicast system is secure against the brute-force attack if every key 10 k is long enough to resist the attack for the life of all messages dependent on key k. Based on the above described result, we can build a methodology for choosing 13 the key length in the LKH tree model. We assume that the payload's lifetime is 14 chosen by the multicast group manager. This is reasonable, since it depends on 15 the confidentiality requirements the manager is willing to enforce on the payload.
16
Then, we compute an upper bound on the lifetime of every key in the system and 17 we formally show which messages are dependent on that keys. Leveraging the result 18 in Claim 1, together with an upper bound to the adversary computational power,
19
we can compute how strong every key in the LKH tree is effectively required to be. 
4.3.1
The Lifetime of The User Private Key. The user private key is individual to each member of the group. It is assigned when the user joins the group and will be used by the center to encrypt individual messages sent to that user until it leaves the group, that is when its private key expires. The life of the user private key is the period of time the user stays in the group. So, to evaluate the lifetime of the user private key, we have to evaluate the period of time between the join and the leave of the typical user in the group. Assume that T uj is the random variable telling how long user u j will stay in the group. We compute the lifetime of user u j 's private key k j+n as the smallest t such that
where > 0 is a design parameter that can be chosen small enough to provide the 21 desired degree of confidence that the user will not exceed the lifetime of its private 22 key in the large majority of cases. Note that, in this last case, a forced re-keying 23 of key k j+n should be issued to protect the security of the system. A small , say 24 = 2 −20 ≈ 10 −6 , guarantees a reasonable level of assurance and an extremely low 25 overhead due to forced re-keyings. Indeed, only one user out of 1/ ≈ 10 6 will 26 exceed its lifetime t on expectation, and a forced re-keying thus occurs only every 27 1/ leaves on average. will end at the next leave in S i . The problem is to compute the lifetime of key k i ; 1 this value will be used to choose k i bit length as shown later on.
2
Let t k i be the instant of generation of key k i and, for every user u j in the multicast group at time t k i , let t uj be the time when user u j joined the group. Moreover, recall that T uj is the random variable telling how long user u j stays in the group from join to leave. So, we can compute T uj ,t k i −tu j , the random variable telling how long, starting from time t k i , user u j will stay in the group before leaving. Since we already know that user u j has been in the group for time t k i − t uj , the time interval before leaving is equal to T uj minus the time elapsed since u j joined the group, conditioned by event {T uj ≥ (t k i − t uj )}; that is:
Key k i will be changed whenever a user in S i leaves, therefore its lifetime can be computed as the smallest time t such that Pr min
The above computation can be used for both the auxiliary keys and the group key. Note that, if you consider keys k i and k 2i (k i is the father of k 2i in the tree), then
and the lifetime of key k i is shorter than the lifetime of key k 2i . This is correct, and k 1 must be renewed. This is done in the following way: to renew k 5 , new 13 key k 5 is sent to u 3 by using its individual key k 11 ; then, to renew k 2 , new key k 2 14 is sent to the sub-tree rooted at k 4 by using k 4 , and to the sub-tree rooted at k 5 by 15 using k 5 ; finally, to renew the group key, new key k 1 is sent to the sub-tree rooted 16 at k 2 by using k 2 , and to the sub-tree rooted at k 3 by using k 3 . The sequence
dependent on k 2 and k 3 , k 2 is dependent on k 4 and k 5 , and k 5 is dependent on k 11 .
19
Recall that dependence is transitive. So, for example, the set of keys dependent on 20 key k 11 is {k 5 , k 2 , k 1 }. To the new user u 2 joining the group are sent the keys in its 21 leaf-root path, that is messages E k 10 (k 5 ), E k 10 (k 2 ), and E k 10 (k 1 ). As a result, the dependence between keys is as described in Figure 3 .
23
We can now generalize. Let B 0 be the empty tree, that is the key tree at time t 0 , 24 when the system starts. Moreover, let B r be the key tree at time t r , right after the r-th re-keying operation (either a leave or a join). From the above discussion,
1
we know that in B r every key k i is dependent on all the keys in the sub-tree of B r 2 rooted at k i . of B r and, by transitivity, on every key in B r (see Figure 3) . Therefore, we get the
12
following results on key and payload dependence in the LKH tree model.
13
Theorem 1. After the r th re-keying, every key k in T r is dependent on all the 14 keys in the sub-tree of T r rooted at k.
15
Theorem 2. Assume that a payload message m is sent at time t, t r ≤ t ≤ t r+1 .
16
Then, payload m is dependent on all the keys in T r . all dependent keys k i/2 , . . . , k 1 it is enough to protect key k i for its whole life.
22
Note that the payload is also dependent on key k i , as implied by Theorem 2. The 23 worst case scenario happens when a payload message is sent right before k i expires.
24
In this case, the life of the payload exceeds the life of the key. By Claim 1, we 25 conclude that key k i has to be protected for time ki + , where ki is k i 's lifetime,
26
and is the payload's lifetime (the only information that depends on k i and whose
27
life exceeds the life of k i ).
28
Hierarchies of Keys in Secure Multicast Communications
To set key k i 's bit length assume that the adversary, in t A seconds, is capable of breaking an s bit key. Therefore, the bit length of key k i should be set to: by a leave. Since there is no point in protecting the payload after key k i expires, it 7 is enough to protect k i for its life to protect all dependent messages.
8
The disclosure security model implies that key k i , for all i, has to be protected just for time ki and the bit length of key k i should be set to:
This completes our model for choosing the key's bit lengths in the LKH tree. In 9 the following section we present a particularly important case, when users behave 10 independently and their joins and leaves are exponentially distributed. In this case,
11
we also provide a numerical example to measure the overall savings that our model 12 can achieve. 
The Exponential Distribution
14
The exponential distribution is widely used in probabilistic models due to its good 15 mathematical properties and to its precision in approximating complex systems
16
composed of a large number of independent entities. In the following, we assume 17 that every single user u j stays in the group for time T uj , where T uj is exponentially 18 and independently distributed with parameter λ. That is, the probability that user 19 u j stays in the group for less than t days is 1 − e −λt .
20
A further research direction would be to extend the proposed model according to 21 different kinds of distributions; however, this is out of the scope of this paper and 22 in the following we will focus on the exponential distribution only.
23
The lifetime of the private keys of the users can be computed by using Equation 1,
This is true whenever
Therefore, the lifetime of the private key k n+j of user u j is
Consider now an auxiliary key k i that has to be renewed at time t r . Since, for all users u j , T uj is exponentially distributed with parameter λ, also
is exponentially distributed with parameter λ. Sometimes, this property is referred to as the memory-less property, a well-known property of the exponential distribution [Haigh 2002 ]. Now, we can compute the lifetime of key k i according to Equation 3. Since the minimum of two independent and exponentially distributed random variables with parameters λ 1 and λ 2 is exponentially distributed with parameter λ 1 + λ 2 , Pr min
where S i is the set of users that share key k i . Therefore, the lifetime of key k i is the smallest t such that
that is belongs to the multicast group for 90 days on the average;
10
-the desired lifetime of the payload is 10 hours, that is 36,000 seconds;
11
-attacker A1 takes 1 second to break a 22-bit key, while attacker A2 takes 1 second 12 to break a 42-bit key;
13
-parameter is set to 10 −6 . keys of a pre-defined length, the procedure is further simplified -there is no need 22 to resort to key stretching-, while the advantages being the same.
23
Now, let us get some real numbers to support our claims. In the specific example above, the lifetime of user u j 's private key k n+j can be computed according to Equation 13 :
Note that key k i is on level log 2 i of the LKH tree, and its lifetime is
nλ log e = 90 × 13.816 × 2 log 2 i 65, 536 days ≈ 1, 640 × 2 log 2 i seconds.
(15) Now, we split our analysis for the two different security models, and for each of 24 these, we consider two types of adversaries A1 and A2. 
where x = log 2 i is the level of key k i .
26 Table II shows the bit length of every key in a LKH tree of 65,536 users when 27 considering the two types of adversaries A1 and A2. Focus on A1: The user's 28 private key should be 49 bits long, while the group key can be just 37 bits long. Table II. Level-by-level key bit length for a 65,536 user LKH tree, for the two types of adversaries A1 and A2. Payload's lifetime is set to 10 hours, users' permanence in the group is 90 days.
required is 709 bits. This is a considerable improvement over the naïve solution 1 with standard key bit length for all keys in the tree. Indeed, assuming that all the 2 keys are set to 128 bits the total memory requirement is 128 × 17 = 2, 176 bits.
3
Our methodology shows an improvement of more than 67.4% in key storage. As 4 for A2, users are required to store 879 bits, thus saving more than the 59.6% on 5 the classical naïve solution. , the bit length of key k i should be set to
We can make two remarks: First, the bit length of a key of the LKH tree in the disclosure security model is shorter than the bit length of the same key in the no-disclosure security model. Indeed, from Equations 16 and 17:
This might seem counter-intuitive. However, this fact reflects the observation that the shorter is the period of time the information is to be kept secret, the shorter is the key. A second remark is that, in the disclosure security model, the difference in bit length of the keys from level x to level x + 1 is exactly one. This allows to precisely quantify the total bit savings upon the best possible solution with all keys with the same length. Indeed, the total number of bits to store the keys of an arbitrary user u j is:
When all keys are set to the maximum length, the total number of bits is: Fig. 4 . Performance of our model compared with the performance of the classical model, for both the no-disclosure and the disclosure security models, when the number of users goes from 2 12 to 2 24 and the adversary is of type A1 and A2. Users' leaves are independently and exponentially distributed.
Thus, the fraction of bits saved by our methodology against any solution with constant key length is:
In Figure 4 , we plot, as a function of the number of users, the number of bits 1 to be stored on each user device, according to both the no-disclosure (NDSM) and 2 disclosure security models (DSM) and taking into account the two different types 3 of adversaries (A1 and A2). Further, note that the same plot also represents the 4 number of bits the center is required to broadcast during a leave. Note that the 5 improvement provided by our methodology tends to increase when the number of 6 users increases for both models and that, when the adversary is of the same type, the 7 disclosure security model allows to save more bits with respect to the no-disclosure 8 one. This is in accordance with intuition: If the payload can be disclosed by evicted 9 users, then it is possible to tune confidentiality to the minimum of the desired 10 period of confidentiality and the practical period during which confidentiality can 11 be effectively preserved, and this helps in reducing the bit length of the keys. confidentiality of the payload to the confidentiality of the keys.
20
To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that formally proves that 
